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Sez Who? 
Critical Legal History without a Privileged Position 
 
John Henry Schlegel 
 
No more than they can we suppress 
The universal wish to guess 
Or slip out of our own position 
Into an unconcerned condition. 
Law Like Love 
W. H. Auden 
 
Back around the turn of this century when Chris Tomlins was working 
on the British colonization of North America, I happened to read a draft of 
some part of this wonderful work dealing with the language used by and 
about the colonizers.  After reading Chris’ critique all of the talk about helping 
the savages by bringing them Christianity and denigrating them for their 
uncivilized behavior, I e-mailed him with a question something like, “Can you 
name a conquering civilization that lamented its colonization, and so 
destruction, of a more advanced, more noble civilization?”  Trick question, I 
suppose.  He shot back a not quite so brusque version of, “No.”  To which I 
immediately replied to the effect of, “If such behavior is so ordinary, then why 
are you being so hard on this group of colonizers?”  His response was typical 
in its directness. He stated something along the lines of, “But, if I have to 
accept the ordinariness of this attitude, then I can’t make my argument!”  
Sensibly, Chris ignored my criticism, and we are all better for his having 
done so, since his argument was a good one – that the bedrock of the 
American experience was violence toward others and not the oft trumpeted 
search for freedom.1  Still, this brief exchange has haunted me ever since, for it 
pointed at a problem that at the time I only inchoately perceived about the 
work of my friends, the scholars involved in Critical Legal Studies (CLS), a 
problem with the way that we treated our critiques as complete when we 
finished, as the last thing that could be said on the subject.  Now the odd thing 
about this problem was that the targets of our critique seemed to agree with 
us.  They acted as if disproving our assertions was the only way to deal with 
our critique.  It seldom seemed that in response they considered mounting a 
critique of our own set of foundational assumptions.  This too was puzzling. 
                                                        
 Thanks to Barry, Dan, Laura, and Fred for their help. 
1.  Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580-1865 
(2010). 
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Now it is important here to remember that Chris is a partisan of 
critique, but in no sense a member, or even a fellow traveler, of Critical Legal 
Studies.  So, I tell this little story because it clearly and cleanly sets up a 
problem with CLS history, however fine such work is, and it is fine.  How was 
it not a problem for us that we did not critique our own set of assumptions as 
best as we could?  How could it not be the case that we too owned and 
suppressed a set of debatable groundings on which we based our argument?  
How was it that we claimed a position outside of history and interest at the 
same time that we were objecting to the assumption of such a position on the 
part of others?  It is this question that I wish to examine. 
 
Of course, like so many things, it all started with Willard Hurst.  When 
he strongly asserted the functionalism of law there were bound to be 
objectors somewhere.  Whether Hurst meant “necessarily” functional I rather 
doubt.  His notion of the “bastard pragmatism” that he saw at the root of much 
law, suggests that he saw functionalism as tied to reason in some way that 
distinguished it from narrow interest.  One might put his understanding as 
something along the line that law is functional in the same way that, in the 
absence of a hammer, a crescent wrench will do to pound a nail into soft pine.  
This may be a way to get the job done, but in the end not a very good way, as 
anyone who has examined my attempts at home repairs would conclude. 
CLS is one place where the objectors appeared; Bob Gordon,2 Morty 
Horwitz,3 and Mark Tushnet4 led the affray.  In some ways Willard was a 
strange target.  He was anything but a consensus historian.5  And he too 
objected to the Vietnam War, the truncation of Civil Rights achievements, the 
crippling of organized labor, objections that for the most part were common 
to CLS partisans.  But he was a partisan of the Brandeisian Progressive, New 
Dealer type and we were not.  He had faith in reason and in the ability of facts 
to shape it use, but an abhorrence of the ordinary uses of reason to justify 
private interest.  While we shared his abhorrence, we did not share either of 
his faiths, or at least sort of did not.  In the end the fight over functionalism 
amounted to nothing, but what it spawned was important.  Critique, even 
Roberto Unger’s “Total Critique,” in Webster’s words “the examination . . . of a 
                                                        
2.  ‘James Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography’, 
(1975)10 Law and Society R 9.  
3.  Or at least so I remember, though I admit I cannot find an appropriate citation. 
4.  ‘Lumber and the Legal Process’, 1972 Wisconsin LR 124. 
5.  Avi Soifer makes this a clear as possible: ‘Willard Hurst, Consensus History and the 
Growth of American Law,’ (1992) 20 Reviews in American History 124. 
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thing or situation . . . with a view to determining its nature or limitations,” was 
to be the major intellectual approach for CLS scholars, even the historians. 
In the academic world of the North Atlantic, the invocation of critique 
ties any activity to Kant’s Critiques, and on the left to the work of the 
Frankfurt School, but more importantly to the idea of reason as a standing 
aside from the object of critique, a standing in a (privileged) place, distanced 
from the object, setting it apart so as to permit seeing the object in its true 
nature.  This is, of course, also the position of the liberal narrative of law that 
was the object of the CLS critique (and of Tomlins’ critique as well).  For CLS 
scholars, the claim of “liberal legalism” that while small bits of law might need 
fixing, the great structure was fundamentally sound, was shot through with 
unexamined preferences for some citizens and not others, in particular 
preferences that established the otherness of these persons – non-whites, 
women, laborers.  Such preferences betrayed the falsity of the cognate claim 
that our liberal democracy was founded on the equality of its citizens. 
The CLS critique of law was extremely effective in the Eighties, so 
effective that it brought forth more than a bit of moral panic on the part of 
liberal legalist scholars, particularly those of a more politically conservative 
stripe.  Still, as the Eighties turned into the Nineties the relevant question 
turned from the nature of liberal legalism to what happened to CLS: Why had 
it faded away?  Feminist Jurisprudence and Critical Race Theory took center 
stage with their separate, but parallel, assertions that personal experience 
grounded their critiques, maybe even supplanted reason as a grounding for 
critique.  By then almost no one remembered the scholarship of Art Leff.  His 
devastating takedowns of both Richard Posner6 and Roberto Unger7 were 
mostly forgotten, as was his assertion that there can be no such a thing as a 
grounding for law or morals other than one based on a belief in God.8  Indeed, 
by then it was becoming clear that in the case of International Human Rights a 
pure, even primitive, positivism provided a sufficient grounding for legal 
action. 
At the same time that these events were taking place, the American 
reception of the great theoretical hubbub, often emanating from France, that 
began with Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions9 and Paul 
                                                        
6.  ‘Economic Analysis of the Law: Some Realism about Nominalism’, (1974) 60 Virginia LR 
451. 
7.  ‘Book Review: Knowldege and Politics’, (1977) 29 Stanford LR. 
8.  ‘Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void’, (1976) Ottawa LR 536; ‘Unspeakable 
Ethics, Unnatural Law’, 1979 Duke LJ 1229. 
9.  (1970). 
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Feyerabend’s Against Method,10 the rediscovery of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations,11 and then Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature,12 quieted down.   Seemingly forgotten were work by 
Gramsci, Lukcas and Althusser, among the various Marxisms; the 
Structuralism of Levi-Strauss, Saussure, and Barthes; the Deconstruction of 
Derrida; the Post-Structuralism of Foucault and Deleuze; a good dose of 
Literary Theory from the likes Eagleton and Fish; the Critical Theory of the 
Frankfurt School and Habermas; remnants of the Existentialism of 
Kierkegaard, Sartre, Buber and Heidegger; Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology; 
Clifford Geertz’s anthropology of “thick description,” and especially for the 
historians, E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class13 and 
Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act14, as well as  the essays in 
Albion’s Fatal Tree.15  Much of this work, though clearly not that of the 
historians, suggested, as had Leff, that the grounding of reason was, if not 
impossible, at least very, very hard. 
In retrospect, the surprising thing about this Nineties quietude is not the 
fact itself, academia fashion changes, though usually less frequently than 
couturier fashion, but rather that the theoretical hubbub going on while CLS 
was in its heyday seemed to have had little impact on CLS scholarship.  We 
never questioned the grounding of our own work, which often littered its star 
footnote with citations to, or at least wave-of-the-hand mentions of, this 
heterogeneous body of once fashionable work.  As best as I can remember, we 
believed that by adopting critique and turning that method on its liberal 
legalist practitioners, we did not have to confront the question of grounding, 
in retrospect a confusion of method – lever – with grounding – a place to stand 
-- in our attempt to move legal scholarship and teaching, a proper 
Archimedean understanding of our job. 
Which is not to say the fancy academic theorists questioned their own 
work either.  Most everyone seemed to go along unself-reflexively, secure in 
his or her understanding that at least his or her scholarship was securely 
grounded, even if everyone else’s wasn’t.  Such is, of course, a preposterous 
position, for much of the relevant fancy academic or CLS scholarship 
implicitly, and often explicitly, asserted that the thought and action that was 
                                                        
10.  (1975).  
11.  (1968). 
12.  (1979). 
12.  (1963). 
14.  (1975. 
15.  (1975). 
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the subject of critique was not just suffering from ignorance of the true facts, 
but rather that it all but intentionally hid the truth, or at the very best 
constructed an argument that obscured the politically loaded valence of the 
thought or action in question, and so elided the truth, a truth known, not 
empirically, but by the exercise of reason. 
Thirty years ago, in the waning days of CLS, it seemed to me that the 
implicit problem of the grounding of truth could be solved locutionally.  In an 
essay review of a fine piece of intellectual history,16 I reasoned as follows: 
If there is no epistemologically privileged position, then I cannot 
know that intellectual history is better written in the fullness of 
such social context as one can muster.  But by the same token, I 
am not limited to mere belief, as the notion of belief is parasitic on 
the notion of knowledge.  Well, if I cannot know and am not 
limited to belief, then I guess that I am sure that I am right.  At 
least I have given my best arguments.  If you are not persuaded, 
try some arguments of your own.  In the alternative, there is 
always thumb wrestling.17 
As I look back, this reasoning was for me, generally a pessimist, a surprisingly 
optimistic assessment, as well as notably self-contradictory, for it invoked 
both a post-modern legal scholarship that mostly never happened in law and a 
modern legal scholarship that ignored the problem of grounding, of 
privileging a position, except when it reveled in occupying such.  In such a 
circumstance, giving one’s best arguments simply will not do.  One needs to 
put those arguments under serious pressure, not wait for someone else to do 
the job.  CLS historical work almost never put its arguments under any 
pressure.  However, it seems to me that to the extent that our work can 
survive serious pressure, that work will be strengthened.  What follows is a 
modest attempt to begin to undertake such a task, if only in a narrow area. 
 
It would be easy to make my point by focusing on other than the best 
work.  However, doing so would undermine my own argument by producing a 
cognate of the kind of work I am criticizing.  Instead, I have chosen to look at 
the labor history written by CLS scholars because it is both the largest body of 
CLS historical work and work of an especially high quality.  Moreover, friends 
and acquaintances have written much of this work.  They have taught me most 
of what I know about labor history and in many cases have helped me with 
                                                        
16.  Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale.  Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press (1986). 
17.  (1989) ‘The Ten Thousand Dollar Question’, 41 Stanford LR 435, 467. 
 6 
the corresponding industrial history that is more central to my interests.  
Their work is worthy of my efforts.  Indeed, sensible people might suggest that 
I am fatally overmatched. 
I wish to start with a piece by Karl Klare about the work of the Supreme 
Court in the late Thirties, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the 
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941.18  The piece began with the 
altogether defensible assertion that the Wagner or National Labor Relations 
Act’s often vague language allowed for multiple possible interpretations of its 
provisions.  It then turned to several Supreme Court decisions that 
contributed significantly to the tone of post-war labor law.  These decisions 
emphasized the centrality of labor peace such as would ensure continuing 
industrial production by instituting a contractual regime that would channel 
worker grievances into a labor-management structure that focused bargaining 
on wages, hours and benefits and so preserved management prerogatives 
over the organization of the production process.  Throughout, the piece 
contrasted this understanding of the Act with one that might have treated 
democratic participation in the production process as central, an 
understanding that might have reduced, if not eliminated, the alienation of 
workers from their work by deemphasizing the importance of the contractual 
agreement between union and management. 
A CLS detractor might explain all of these decisions by pointing out that 
the sit down strikes in the pursuit of union goals that occurred in these years 
created a reasonable fear of union disruption of production.   But given the 
amount of management disruption of workers’ lives over the previous 150 
years, such an explanation is hardly worth mention, even if accompanied by 
the modestly rational fear of communist infiltration in the union movement.  
Another possible justification of these decisions, founded on the necessity for 
a clean demarcation of the working class from the management class, is 
equally unsatisfactory and for similar reasons.  After all, the owners and 
managers of industrial enterprises regularly unsettled the lives of laborers 
over the same period of time.  Disruption of a status quo simply won’t cut it.  
Nor is there any reason to believe that the union movement so respected chief 
Justice Hughes that anything he would have written for the Court would have 
been a sufficient justification for these decisions.  However, there is a possible, 
if ultimately limited, justification in the nature of the American economy at 
that time that surely deserved to be taken into account by CLS scholars.  Still, 
                                                        
18.  (1978) 62 Minnesota LR 265.  
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to understand what that is would require knowing some of the history of that 
economy at least back to the Gilded Age, if not earlier. 
 
Start with a basic truism.  Real competition sucks! Operating at the point 
where marginal cost (including the marginal cost of capital) equals marginal 
revenue is damn scary.  Bankruptcy is uncomfortably close.  The same is even 
clearer for labor.  The place where the last ounce of effort equals the last cent 
in wages puts abject poverty, if not starvation, uncomfortably close.  Now, of 
course, as consumers, labor prefers goods sold at marginal cost and as 
consumers, capital prefers wages set at marginal cost, but that is not to say 
that the structural similarity of these positions with respect to competition 
suggests a real world similarity of situations.  Corporate bankruptcy does not 
imply the starvation that may follow from the loss of a job; after all, resource 
endowments of capital and labor are radically different, else labor would, or at 
least might, draw on resources and simply reinvest, as capital has done.  Still, 
neither capital nor labor likes living in a competitive market; both have every 
reason to wish to escape it.  They have long tried to do so. 
Before World War I big capital attempted to overcome competition by 
the merger of competitors to the point that the market sway of one participant 
was such as to create an effective monopoly, or at least to protect all of the 
other participants in the dominant firm’s shadow.  Eventually the Supreme 
Court made this difficult.  Labor tried unionization.  Here, even after securing 
legislation in its favor, the lower federal courts similarly managed to make 
unionization difficult by enjoining strikes on various grounds.  Neither capital 
nor labor was happy with the result.  Still, even more unhappy was small and 
medium-sized capital, the far more numerous local retailers, wholesalers, and 
manufacturers, who were finding that their relative, transportation-cost-
based insulation from local competition was being eroded by the growth of 
big capital.   
After the end of The Great War, big capital seems to have started trying 
to limit competition through oligopolistic structures, though it was still 
extraordinarily worried about the possibility that unionized labor would 
upset such fragile structures.  Medium and small capital, generally more 
dispersed geographically, tried to create similar structures through the 
mechanism of establishing business associations, such as the Maple Flooring 
Manufacturers Association, but retailers and wholesalers still felt left out.   
These actions seem to have taken place in tandem with the ideas of a 
group of economists, called Institutionalists, who started writing before that 
War.  They believed that economic instability was the result of excess 
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production of goods and services, coupled with relentless downward pressure 
on producer prices caused by "chiselers" who reduced prices and otherwise 
"cut corners" for temporary personal advantage.  These economists argued 
that downward pressure on prices could be resisted if producers banded 
together into groups that would work both to "coordinate" production (i.e., 
manage reduction and expansion) and to isolate and vilify chiselers, so as to 
enforce good — and thereby suppress "unfair" — trade practices.  Their ideas 
coalesced into a theory called Associationalism. 
This theory was essentially a Main Street, though not therefore a small 
town, theory.  It hoped to maintain high wages through the high prices that 
would support small, local retail or wholesale businesses.   It was not laissez-
faire in a different guise, for it assumed some level of governmental 
involvement in the economy to remedy insufficient demand in poor times by 
increasing, not decreasing, employment and by providing social insurance so 
as to maintain the disposable income of wage earners faced with 
unemployment or retirement.  Which is not to say that as a general matter 
either capital or labor supported the whole package, but it was a package that 
attracted some progressives in the years after the World War I and that 
obviously informed much New Deal legislation, both that found constitutional 
and that found unconstitutional.   
It is also true that these ideas are redolent of Spanish, Italian and 
German corporatism that turned Fascist in the mid-Thirties.  However, at the 
same time it is possible that such ideas were attractive on their own as a way 
of mediating between the claims of capital and labor, granting capital some 
protection from sudden bankruptcy and labor some protection from declining 
income.  It is not hard to see Associationalism as implying exactly what 
happened, a law that recognized the centrality of labor peace such as would 
ensure continuing industrial production under a contractual regime that 
would channel worker grievances into a labor-management structure that 
focused bargaining on wages, hours and benefits and so preserve 
management prerogatives over the organization of the production process.   
In order to effectively criticize this regime it is not enough to say that 
from the perspective of radical labor it denied workers their rights to self-
determination in structuring their employment and the production process, 
any more than it is enough to say that from the perspective of radical capital it 
would be sufficient to criticize this regime for failing to allow capital to 
exclude labor from any role in structuring the terms and conditions of 
employment.  One would at least need to recognize that in these years 
competition had been experienced as sufficiently inimical to the interests of 
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both capital and labor so that both had reason to dampen it.19  The desire to 
limit competition might well explain the choices that the Supreme Court made 
in the early years of interpreting the Wagner Act. 
 
Next consider a piece about a much earlier period in American labor 
history, Wythe Holt’s Labor Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 1805-1842: 
Bias and Legitimation in Common Law Adjudication.20  The piece examined all 
the reported early Nineteenth Century cases in which unions of journeymen 
were charged with common law criminal conspiracy for evidence of anti-
union bias.  These years experienced a continuing breakdown of the once 
traditional relationship of the irregular, but shared, work schedule of masters 
and journeymen in urban areas in both the clothing and shoemaking trades 
and its replacement with the growth of more regular, but no longer shared, 
work schedule punctuated with layoffs of indefinite duration – an early 
approximation of factory employment.  The journeymen objected to these 
changes and in response they formed unions to fight for better wages and 
terms of employment.  Masters responded by bringing charges that these 
unions were engaged in a criminal conspiracy.  The journeymen’s arguments 
in defense of their unions centered on the loss of worker independence, self-
esteem, and local communal estimate of worth, all of which were related to 
the changes in working conditions.   
The varying reports of these cases quite clearly illustrated the claim of 
bias against the journeymen on the part of the various judges who ruled for 
employers in these cases.  However, the piece did not stop there, but also 
identified the causes of the change in working conditions in significant detail – 
urbanization, expansion of urban markets, growth of an Atlantic market 
economy subject to periodic disruption followed by reinvigorated 
competition, and in-migration of both domestic farm workers and foreign 
laborers.  Still, in this piece these causes seem to be related to, and justify the 
actions of, the journeymen alone.  This is strange. 
 
If competition sucks, change in the circumstances of competition sucks 
even more.  The stability of the master-journeyman-apprentice relationship 
was pretty much dependent on limited or even absent local competition.  
Competition was limited by the combination of the geographic structure of the 
                                                        
19.  Both Holmes – Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167 Mass. 92, 108-9 (1896) and Plant v. Woods, 176 
Mass 492, 505 (1900, dissent) -- and Brandeis – Hichman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 
U.S. 229, 271 (1917, dissent) – understood this point, though not in precisely the same way. 
20.  (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall LJ 591. 
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local area and the cost of transportation.  Limited competition allowed for 
informal constraints on price by producers, as well as local social constraints 
on avarice, and so allowed marginal revenue at least modestly to exceed 
marginal cost.  Absent competition abetted the maintenance of social relations 
between the three statuses, often in a combination with shared residence and 
working space.   
Significant urban growth and a reduction of transportation costs both 
increased competition; together they were even worse.  The piece recognized 
that the increase in the size of port cities, in part by in-migration from 
surrounding rural areas and Northern Europe, and in part by the expansion of 
the Atlantic market, both littoral and oceanic, significantly changed the terms 
of competition among the masters.  This change thus threatened both the 
economic and social position of what it meant to be a master.  Possible 
responses to this change were several.  Some older masters could effectively 
retire; others might concentrate on up market niches where price was less 
important.  However, for most masters the major alternative to the slow 
decent into bankruptcy was to abandon the master-journeyman-apprentice 
model of the trade to a greater or lesser extent.  Whether choosing to cut back 
on the enrollment of apprentices or to move into real factory production and 
so expand the number of employees who would formerly have been treated as 
apprentices, or even to try developing a model of something in between, the 
strategy of economic and social survival chosen by most masters was that of 
reducing the cost of labor.  Process innovation was unlikely to reduce costs 
significantly, and even if it did, the advantage it provided was likely the same -
- reducing the cost of labor. 
Thus, it was anything but surprising that it was the journeymen who felt 
squeezed by the alteration in the terms of competition and for whom 
unionization was an obvious response.  Nor was the response of the masters 
to unionization surprising as they were being squeezed too.  Both parties 
were finding that their economic and social status was under assault.  Both 
were fighting to maintain that status in a world where urbanization, in-
migration and changes in transportation were fraying the social bonds on 
which the apprentice-journeyman-master system depended for its 
maintenance.  Neither group was acting implausibly.  In a world where, 
economically speaking, sunk costs are sunk and so should be ignored by each 
group, the sunk human capital that was under threat of being rendered less 
valuable was a life.  Lives are not an easily dispensed with as might be an 
outmoded lathe or a no longer needed hand tool.  Indeed, the capital recovery 
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period for a life is probably longer than that life itself, extending forward at 
least until one’s children are well settled. 
Here then the choice that law made in this time of economic disruption 
was not just between labor and management, as this piece asserts and as is 
plainly the case, but also a choice between two groups that were seeing their 
settled lives upended, just as was the case with the Wagner Act in the 
Nineteen Thirties.  One group chose to attempt to organize collectively and the 
other appeared not to, though, of course, it would have been much easier for 
the masters to hide their cartel, if there were one, than for the journeymen to 
hide their union.21  And so facially the courts were doing exactly what they 
said -- holding both groups to the identical competitive standard, while at the 
same time ignoring the difference in the resources that each could bring to 
address the change in economic and social circumstances that threatened 
both groups’ lives. And so, it is less the obvious class bias in the courts of law 
that the piece so clearly documents that is troubling.  After all, such is a 
constant in the history of law.  Rather, it is the difference in response to 
similar threats to the social and economic position of both groups in this time 
of economic turmoil on the part of judges. 
 
Dianne Avery dealt with the years in between Klare’s piece and Holt’s.  
Images of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence: the Regulation of Picketing and 
Boycotts, 1894-192122 focused on opinions in litigation, primarily in the 
federal courts, and of Supreme Court Justices, most of whom were active 
during the heydays of the laissez faire Gilded Age.   In great detail it first 
derived and then traced out the impact of the judicial understanding that 
workers were irrational and easily prone to violence, especially when under 
the influence of “outsiders,” persons not part of an individual factory’s 
workforce.  For these judges such a propensity to violence meant that any 
resort to more confrontational economic weapons than the strike (a passive 
unwillingness to work), weapons such as picketing and boycotts, needed to be 
very carefully policed lest they interfere with employer’s rights of property. 
The piece made it clear that it was not just labor that could be described 
as being prone to violence.  As Brandeis and Holmes recognized, the idea of a 
somehow uncoercive economic warfare was implausible.23  The economic 
warfare between producers that was part of legally approved competition was 
                                                        
21.  This point was made some years ago by a man named Adam Smith: The Wealth of 
Nations, Bk. 1, chap. 8, Paras. 11, 12 & 13 (5th Ed. 1789).  
22.  (1988) 37 Buffalo LR 1.  
23.  Supra note 19.  
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just as coercive, just as threatening to the rights of property, as anything that 
workers might do.  Still, the failure of judges to see this equivalence made it 
clear that that when limiting labor action to activities that were not coercive, 
judges in fact preferred one of the parties in a labor dispute. 
 
At several points Images of Violence noted the economic disruption that 
characterized the laissez fare years.  The combination of the final build-out of 
the rail transportation system, the great growth of metal bending technology, 
and the growth in immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe 
significantly increased the level of competition both between manufacturers 
and between workers.  The adoption of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act showed 
how quickly manufacturers saw merger, and so growth of geographic scope, 
as a possible way to regain a modest control over pricing that market 
expansion had reduced.  Similarly, the adoption of the Interstate Commerce 
Act showed how quickly both farmers and rural manufacturers became 
dependent on rail transport to build market access and the degree to which 
freight rates impacted such access, even for business that were on railroad 
mainlines.  Perhaps, equally importantly, the Civil War was understood as a 
lesson in the economic importance of unimpeded railroad transport for the 
economy as a whole. 
In competitive circumstances such these, smaller producers felt an 
intense production-related cost pressure.  Larger producers who had 
generally engaged in various financial shenanigans to reach such size found 
that similar pressures were magnified by the fiscal discipline of the debt 
repayment schedule that regularly accompanied such expansion.  All of these 
pressures were augmented by the seeming necessity of ever increasing 
expenditures for capital goods that accompanied technological change.  For 
firms of either size the major cost that could be controlled when competition 
brought price pressure was wages, or so it seemed to management.  For labor 
such cost control through wage reduction, head-count reduction, skilled labor 
reduction, the dreaded speedup or often a combination of all four, amounted 
to a decrease in economic and social status/security.  For management a 
possible inability to control costs also amounted to a similar decrease in 
economic and social status/security. 
This last statement with the introduction of the word “management” 
shows the degree to which the years that this piece explored were different 
from the years before the Civil War.   The masters were management and 
owners as well.  The possibility of shifting language from “master” to 
“management” indicates the degree to which the separation of ownership and 
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control, so firmly attached to scholarship of the late Twenties, was already in 
full swing in the Gilded Age Nineties.  Andrew Carnegie may have “owned” 
Carnegie Steel, but the fact that his ownership was so noteworthy indicates 
how unusual such a circumstance already was.  One may identify John D. 
Rockefeller with Standard Oil, but he was not that firm’s owner in the sense 
that Carnegie owned Carnegie Steel; Henry Ford did not secure both 
ownership and control until he brought out the Dodge brothers in 1919. 
Owners, so-called stockholders, often had different concerns than 
managers, and large stockholder managers more different still.  For a manager 
the threat of economic failure was in some real sense the same as such failure 
was to a worker -- job loss, diminished income, a lower standard of living and 
a concomitant decline in social status, unless job search quickly resulted in 
securing equivalent employment, a pretty iffy possibility – though of a 
different magnitude for workers than managers.  Stockholders faced a loss of 
income, often substantial given that the stockholder with a well-diversified 
portfolio didn’t appear on the economic scene until after World War II.  But in 
most cases an even modestly diversified stockholder had wealth concentrated 
in only a few equity positions and so the loss of one such position might mean 
a significant decline in the value of one’s estate. 
 While there is little reason to cry over such a relevantly large loss – 
destitution was unlikely to be the result – smaller losses might be thought of 
differently given that corporate debt and even preferred stock was owned in 
small amounts, often as part of a sort of do-it-yourself retirement plan, by the 
much larger group of families who qualified in some sense as middle class.  
Yet, even these supposedly more secure investments had a bad habit of 
becoming valueless at the same time that the issuer declared bankruptcy, at 
least in the case of manufacturing companies.  For such middle class owners a 
decline in social and economic status was also likely and new jobs hard to 
find. 
Owner stockholders, so-called controlling persons, were in these years, 
primarily family and friends of the founders of the original business.  In many 
cases these people were leaches on the tits of capitalism, more concerned 
about maintaining social status and lifestyle than about any particular 
investment.  But not always; often they were unwittingly friends of the 
workers, especially when out of sentiment for the founders they pushed to 
keep the business alive far longer than a heartless capitalism would dictate 
based on the notion that sunk costs are sunk. 
Again, I am not arguing for the moral equivalence of capital and labor, 
any more than I argued for such equivalence in the Early Republic or the 
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Nineteen Thirties.  Capital always has more options for recovery from an 
economic setback than labor and thus is more able to be generous. But, what I 
am arguing is that it is not surprising that when trying to understand behavior 
at a time when the species of capitalism that the law confronted was about as 
close to dog-eat-dog as sensible people might wish, one needs to understand 
why capital might have felt itself to be as much under siege as did labor. 
Capital’s response to labor in the Gilded Age and thereafter was not just 
a reflexive ideological defense of itself, though there was quite a bit of that, but 
also it was a response to the same forces that made labor’s lot so awful.  And 
equally important, capital was not an undifferentiated “it.”  Capital 
represented groups of people in many situations with many different 
concerns, only some of which I have identified.  A stronger argument for the 
inappropriateness of the consistent understanding of labor violence that the 
courts peddled in these years would have recognized the degree to which that 
understanding responded only to what some capitalists experienced, 
individuals whose response came from a place closer to that of labor than 
anyone was willing to admit. 
 
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule,24 by Jay Feinman, helps 
to bring my point about the differential similarity of capitalism’s creative 
destruction home once again.  This piece reviewed the slow alteration of the 
American version of the traditional English rule that a hiring for other than a 
specified duration is presumed to be for one year.  As, in the years before the 
Civil War the most common hirings slowly changed from agricultural and 
domestic to commercial and manufacturing, doctrinal confusion seemed to 
increase, both in the cases and on the part of the treatise writers.  After that 
war, bargain theory of contract entrenched itself at the same time that 
litigation slowly shifted to claims made by middle managers whose 
employment opportunities increased as businesses grew in size.  Most of 
these cases thus turned on questions of the intent of the parties.  After a series 
of contradictory cases in New York, the major commercial jurisdiction in the 
United States, all of which involved middle managers, in 1895 the matter was 
finally settled by the New York Court of Appeals with the explicit adoption of 
the employment at will rule, a rule that quickly spread throughout the  and.  
It is fitting that this bit of law should solidify in the high Gilded Age and 
right after the great Panic of 1893.  Middle management was the last part of 
economic life that had a claim to being something other than either owners or 
                                                        
24.  (1976) 20 American Journal of Legal History 118. 
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workers, neither capital nor labor.  It was a precarious status at a time when 
competition was so cut throat.  In such an era everyone was expendable.  Not 
surprisingly, middle management was not again treated well until after the 
New Deal and wartime destruction overseas reduced competition to an 
oligopolistic minimum, but even then “at will” survived, whatever might have 
been the then middle manager’s expectation of future employment. 
 
Little understanding can be found in the CLS literature of the 
circumstances of fired middle managers.  Workers, yes; management, no; 
much less owners of various kinds whose businesses became bankrupt.  And 
yet, all of these people have families, suffer loss, surely not the same loss, but 
loss nevertheless.  In this way CLS history suffers from the problem that we 
regularly asserted was inherent in the work of in our liberal legalist 
opponents – the belief that our perspective was timeless, privileged, true 
even.  But critique, whether based on class, ethnicity, gender or sexuality, is no 
more privileged than that of the object of critique.  Neither research nor 
personal experience establishes the truth of an interpretation of events.  The 
high ground is to be found with the recognition that there is no such thing . . . 
for nobody. 
That history is part of a world in which one cannot know, but is not 
therefore limited to belief, as I wrote earlier, does not mean that one cannot 
say anything with an appropriate level of assurance, a politics even.  In our 
writing we choose who are the winners, who are the losers, and sometimes 
even who are the also-rans.  But no matter what our choice is, the question 
remains: With what degree of assurance may we speak?    Who sez?  Here I 
would argue that assurance is greater when one recognizes and accounts for 
those whose understanding of the events in question does not square with 
one’s own.  Such an understanding is appropriate not because it is fairer -- 
that proposition is silly -- but because it is more human – compromised, fallen 
even, self-centered, and best understood in a lived context that for each of us 
combines both the comfort of present circumstance and the fear of change 
that may threaten social and economic position in scary ways.  This is even 
true when telling stories in which we believe that “the good guys” won, not 
everything – law is always trumped by culture to a greater or lesser degree – 
but something.  No matter how important the achievement may be, there will 
always have been losers, at least from their perspective, people who believe 
that their social and economic position has been diminished.  It is by 
recognizing their loss that we strengthen our win by validation their, and thus 
our, common humanity. 
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Consider the Tomlins’ work I spoke of at the outset.  It seems relatively 
obvious that the explorers and colonists that he speaks about were pretty 
scared in this world that was new to them, despite the vast difference in 
weaponry between themselves and the people already settled in North 
America.  It seems fairly common, ordinary even, that people who find 
themselves in what they take to be scary places make up stories that justify 
their behavior in these places.  Such stories appear in the news every week 
with respect to white people in black neighborhoods.  Recognizing this 
likelihood would not diminish the power of Tomlins’ story, rather, by taking 
these peoples’ fears (on both sides) seriously and accounting for both those 
real fears and the brutal reactions they brought, his story would be 
strengthened, just as would be the case with CLS historians writing about the 
workers, managers, and masters/owners faced with economic change in CLS 
stories about labor history. 
Now, none of this criticism should be taken to suggest that the CLS labor 
historians should be faulted for the history that they actually wrote.  There 
really was no other choice.  They. Like tomlins, told stories that cried out for 
the telling since they had never before figured prominently in the tale of law 
in America. Thus the fault, if there be fault, as opposed to another of the 
endless list of examples of historians “doin’ what comes natur’lly,” was on the 
part of the liberal legalist historians who should have included the stories of 
American workers, indeed of democracy’s losers of all kinds, in their telling of 
the story of the triumph of American law and legal culture.  Their scholarship, 
like ours, would have been made stronger had they recognized loss as they 
wrote of what they saw as gain.  Having not done so, the temptation to 
highlight their error was simply too tasty to pass up.  CLS historians enjoyed 
the feast. 
 I hope that what I have said is not interpreted to mean that I believe in 
the possibility of writing “objective” history.  Auden captures the human 
desire to ”slip out of our own position,” but he also recognizes the 
impossibility of doing so, except as a boast.  Yes, dates and places and texts 
can be known in the way that astronomers know that that big yellow-orange 
ball that appears in the sky with some regularity is a star around which our 
planet orbits, but as soon as an historian tries to give shape, and so meaning, 
to what in the words of William James is that “blooming, buzzing confusion” of 
particularities by including and excluding, emphasizing or deemphasizing 
things, any plausible claim to objectivity goes out the window.   
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Historians live in the world that Peter Novick so trenchantly described 
as That Noble Dream.25  We are always trapped by our past and our present, 
by our race and ethnicity, our gender and sexual orientation, our education 
and class position, our toilet training and other rebellions.  All of these things 
preclude us from ever acquiring either an “unconcerned” or a privileged 
position.  But being trapped does not mean that we have no obligation to do 
our very best to understand the many worlds of the people in our various 
stories about the past.  We need to understand, and not in caricature, 
simultaneously both the workers and the capitalists, the feminists and the 
misogynists, the racists and the objects of their vilification, the urbanists and 
suburbanists and ruralists, the adherents of various religions and those 
without such beliefs.26  This is not because their beliefs and actions are of 
equal value -- our writing ultimately discloses how we value them, as it should 
-- but because they are all humans, all trapped in their past and present just as 
we historians are, and so our efforts to understand them tells us something 
about the world that our species instantiates.  And, after all, that is the point of 
studies in the humanities and social sciences, studies that history is a part of. 
 
After reading a less fleshed out version of this piece, Barry Cushman 
impishly asked, “Can you name a successful critical reform movement that 
devoted a lot of effort to analyzing and critiquing its own animating 
foundational assumptions?”  And so I am pleased to return to where I started, 
but with a more modest answer this time, though not obviously Chris Tomlins’ 
answer.  I know that the answer to Barry’s question is “No,” but as an 
intellectual utopian -- my fifty year of attempting to identify and sell a less 
awful curriculum for the first year of law school ought to be sufficient 
evidence – that “No” does mean that we of the party of the left should not try.   
As a utopian I believe that when not in a Maoist mode, self-criticism would 
more fully reflect the position that scholars, especially the historians whose 
work I know and love, are in when and whatever they write.  And I hope that 
such more capacious reflection on the limitations of positionality just might 
                                                        
25.  (1988). 
26.  Dan Ernst reminds me that such will not be easy, for when he made a similar assertion 
in presenting the chapter on the Danbury Hatters Case from his book Lawyers Against 
Labor: From Industrial Rights to Corporate Liberalism (1995) at the labor history meetings, 
the great labor historian David Montgomery protested, “I’m supposed to feel sorry for a 
capitalist?” Had I been there, I hope that I would have had sufficient courage to have 
spoken in Dan’s defense and answered, “No, for a human.” 
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allow our critique to be effective for more than the statutory fifteen minutes of 
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